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Abstract
We introduce an algorithmic method for population anomaly detection based on
gaussianization through an adversarial autoencoder. This method is applicable to
detection of ‘soft’ anomalies in arbitrarily distributed highly-dimensional data.
A soft, or population, anomaly is characterized by a shift in the distribution of the
data set, where certain elements appear with higher probability than anticipated.
Such anomalies must be detected by considering a sufficiently large sample set
rather than a single sample.
Applications include, but not limited to, payment fraud trends, data exfiltration,
disease clusters and epidemics, and social unrests. We evaluate the method on
several domains and obtain both quantitative results and qualitative insights.
1 Introduction
Divergences between anticipated and actual distribution of the data, colloquially called data anoma-
lies, are often analysed on the level of individual elements of the data set: a yellow ball in the basket
where only red balls would be considered an anomaly. A less extreme example would be a basket
of red balls with yellow spots, but with still ‘enough’ red exposed. Here, a ball with, say, more than
90% of the surface covered with yellow spots would be considered an anomaly.
However, there are cases when the anomaly can be identified by only considering the whole data set.
For example, a basket contains red and yellow balls. We expect the number of red and yellow balls
to be about the same. An anomaly then is five times as many yellow balls as red balls in the basket.
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Figure 1: Individual (a) vs. population (b) anomaly. Anomalous data points may have high density
w.r.t. the anticipated distribution.
This work is concerned with the latter case. We call population anomaly a phenomenon where the
distribution of elements, rather than an individual element taken an isolation, is abnormal. In pop-
ulation anomalies, each anomalous data point may have high probability mass or density w.r.t. the
anticipated distribution (Figure 1). Fraud trends in electronic payment systems, disease clusters in
public health care, data exfiltration through network protocols are just some examples of population
anomalies. While considering a population anomaly, we want to evaluate the hypothesis that the
distribution underlying the data set diverges from the anticipated distribution, and, assuming that the
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data set is a mixture, obtain the probability for each sample to come either from the regular or from
the anomalous component of the mixture.
In a single dimension, the problem can be solved rather straightforwardly, for example, by perform-
ing Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or constructing a histogram. However, as the number of dimensions
grows, in particular in presence of complicated interdependencies and heterogeneous data types,
straightforward brute-force approaches stop working, which is known as ‘the curse of dimensional-
ity.’ Building on previous work, we propose a method for efficient detection and ranking of popula-
tion anomalies.
2 Problem statement
We formulate population anomaly detection as the following machine learning problem.
We are given a data set S = {x ∈ Rk} where each sample x is i.i.d. from an unknown distribution
P = P0 — the training set. Further on, we are given a data set S′ = {x′ ∈ Rk} where each sample
is drawn from P ′ which is a mixture of P0 and unknown distribution P1 — the evaluation set with
unknown mixing probability γ. We assume that, given a sample set of sufficient size from each of
P0, P1, P0 and P1 can be distinguished at any given confidence level.
We want to test the hypothesis that S and S′ were drawn from two different distributions P0 and P ′
and to assess the probability α(x′) for each sample x′ ∈ S′ to be drawn from P1 rather from P0.
3 Related work
Related work belongs to three areas of machine learning research: population anomalies, gaussian-
ization, and adversarial autoencoders.
Population anomaly detection and divergence estimation is explored in [9, 11]. [12] apply population
(group) anomaly detection to social media analysis.
Guassianization as a principle for tackling the curse of dimensionality in high-dimensional data was
first introduced in [4] and further developed in [7, 5] and other publications. Iterative algorithms
involving component-wise gaussianization and ICA were initially proposed, with various modifica-
tions and improvements in later publications.
Adversarial autoencoders, a deep learning architecture for variational inference, facilitate learnable
invertible gaussianization of high-dimensional large data sets. The architecture was introduced in
[8]. The use of autoencoders in general and adversarial autoencoders in particular for detection of
(individual) anomalies is explored in [6, 10, 13, 3].
This work differs from earlier research in that it introduces a black-box machine learning approach
to detection and ranking of population anomalies. The approach is robust to dimensionality and
distribution properties of the data and scalable to large data sets.
4 The Method
To handle population anomalies, we employ an adversarial autoencoder [8] to project the anticipated
distribution of the data set into a multivariate unit normal distribution, that is to apply multivariate
gaussianization [4] to the data. We then use the gaussianized representation to detect and analyse
population anomalies.
4.1 Gaussianization
An adversarial autoencoder (Figure 2) consists of two networks, the autoencoder and the discrimi-
nator.
The autoencoder has two subnetworks, the encoder and the decoder. The encoder projects the
data into internal representation, which is in our case a multivariate unit normal, N (0, I). The
decoder reconstructs the data sample from a point in the space of the internal representation. The
discriminator ensures that the internal representation is indeed normally distributed.
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Figure 2: Adversarial autoencoder
After training, the encoder and decoder implement invertible gaussianization. For every sample in
the data set, a corresponding sample from N (0, I) is computed by the encoder, and the sample can
be recovered by the decoder.
We train the autoencoder on the training data set, which represents the anticipated distribution. Then,
we use the encoder to project the evaluation data set on the space of the internal representation. If
the distribution of the evaluation set diverges from that of the training set, the projection of the
evaluation set will diverge from unit multivariate normal distribution.
4.2 Detection
Unit multivariate normal distribution eliminates the curse of dimensionality because the dimensions
are mutually independent. Instead of testing the projection of the evaluation set against the multivari-
ate distribution, we can test the distribution along each dimension independently, and then combine
statistics over all dimensions to detect an anomaly.
Any goodness-of-fit test assessing normality of a sample can be used. Statistics which scale well
to large sample sizes and are sensitve to local discrepancies in the distributions should be preferred.
In our realization of the method we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, which allows natural
probabilistic interpretation and works sufficiently well in practice (see Section 5).
For combining the statistics over all dimensions, we use a p-norm. In simple computational eval-
uations L1 norm worked well enough. When we are concerned with anomalies caused by small
intrusions or perturbations in particular, L∞, that is, taking the maximum of statistics over axes, is a
reasonable choice. L∞ also serves as a lower bound on the hypothesis test that S and S′ come from
the same distribution. If the hypothesis can be rejected (that is, there is a population anomaly in S′)
based on a single dimension of the gaussianized representation, then by all means the hypothesis
could have been rejected if all dimensions were considered.
4.3 Ranking
In addition to testing for presence of an anomaly in the evaluation set, we would like to rank each
element of the evaluation set by the probability to belong to the anomaly.
Here again we leverage the adversarial autoencoder. The discriminator component is trained to
distinguish between the projection and the unit multivariate normal distribution. We will reuse the
discriminator component to predict the anomality of each element.
As trained during the training phase of the adversarial autoencoder, discriminator is not yet useful
for ranking the evaluation set. However, we can take the pre-trained discriminator and train on the
evaluation set to distinguish between the projection of the evaluation set and samples from the unit
multivariate normal distribution. The more the evaluation set diverges from the training set, the
higher will be classification accuracy. Elements which are more likely to come from the anomalous
component (P1 in the problem statement) will be classified as such with higher confidence.
Indeed, we rank the elements of the evaluation set using the discriminator:
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1. We project the evaluation set into the internal representation using the encoder trained on
the training set.
2. We train the discriminator to distinguish between the projection of the evaluation set and
the unit multivariate normal distribution, assigning label 1 to the evaluation set and label 0
to random samples.
3. After training, we classify the projection of the evaluation set by the discriminator and use
the predicted label (1 is definitely an anomaly, 0 is definitely a random sample) as the rank
of anomality, and then backpropagate the labels to the original data.
The discriminator is trained with binary cross-entropy loss. An optimally trained discriminator will
rank each projection z′ of sample x′ with the probability β(x′) of the projection (and hence of the
data sample) to come from P ′. β(x′) can be used to estimate the probability α(x′) of x′ to come
from P1. Indeed, denoting the densities of P0 and P1 as f0 and f1 correspondingly, and the ratio
f1(x
′)
f0(x′)
as ϕ(x) we obtain:
α(x′) =
γϕ(x′)
1− γ + γϕ(x′) , β(x
′) =
1− γ + γϕ(x′)
2− γ + γϕ(x′)
α(x′) ≈ 2− 1
β(x′)
for γ  1, β(x′) ≥ 1
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Figure 3: α and β vs. γϕ for γ  1.
α(x′) increases with β(x′) as function of γϕ(x′). For γ  1, which is the case in anomalies, α(x′)
and β(x′) as functions of γϕ(x′) are shown in Figure 3. α = 12 , that is, the density of anomalous
samples being equal to the density of regular samples, corresponds to β ≈ 23 .
4.4 Method Outline
Let us now summarize the algorithmic steps constituting the method:
• Training:
1. Train the adversarial autoencoder on the training set.
• Detection:
1. Project the evaluation set on the internal representation space using the encoder.
2. Compute KS statistics for each dimension of the projection.
3. Combine the compute statistics over all dimensions using a p-norm (e.g. take the
maximum KS statistic) and use the combined value to test whether an anomaly is
present.
• Ranking:
1. Train the discriminator to distinguish between the projection of the evaluation set and
random samples from the unit multivariate normal distribution.
2. Classify the evaluation set using the trained discriminator network.
3. Sort the elements in the evaluation set according to the rank assigned by the classifier.
4. Report elements with the highest ranks as the most ‘surprising’ ones, i.e. those most
likely to belong to an anomaly.
5 Empirical Evaluation
In the empirical evaluation that follows we evaluate the method on three domains of different struc-
ture and from different application areas. In all cases, point-based anomaly detection cannot be ap-
plied to detect the anomalies as the probability of each individual element belonging to the anomaly
is as high as or higher than of some of the regular elements in the training set.
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Figure 4: Novelty in credit card transaction data.
However, unusually high probabilities of the anomalous elements in the evaluation set indicate the
anomaly which is detected by the introduced method for population anomaly detection.
5.1 Credit Card Payments
We were provided with a data set of credit card transaction data over a month. The data set contains
≈ 2 million transactions. We divided the data into 168 buckets, for each hour of each day of the
week. For each bucket, a separate model is trained. A data record consists of 14 fields of both contin-
uous (transaction amount, conversion rate) and categorical (country, currency, market segment, etc.)
types. In the expanded form, each record is represented by a 415-element vector. 8-dimensional
internal representation was used. Since the data is a mixture of continuous and categorical values,
mean squared error loss was used as the reconstruction loss of the autoencoder.
We use the method to compare different hours of day and different days of week. There are (24 ·
7)2 = 28224 possible combinations of model and data, to which we apply the method.
5.1.1 Detection
Figure 4 presents some of results of quantifying anomality (novelty) between different hours of the
week. The hours are per the Pacific Time Zone.
Figure 4a shows novelty of each hour over a week relative to a particular hour’s model, for 4 ran-
domly selected hours.
• Same hours on different days, even as different as Monday and Sunday, have similar distri-
butions.
• Weekdays are more similar to each other than a weekday and a weekend.
Figure 4b shows relative novelty in each pair of hours over a single day (Wednesday). The lighter
the square, the more similar the model and the data hours are. There are three regions of similarly
looking hours (appearing as light squares on the plots). We marked these regions by dashed colored
boxes. Ranking of transactions in hours belonging to different regions (see Section 5.1.2) suggests
geographical interpretation of peak activities:
• 1 – 4 (blue box) — Europe and Middle East
• 6 – 14 (red box) — Americas
• 16 – 23 (green box) — Asia-Pacific
5.1.2 Ranking
We consider top-ranked transactions from several combinations of data and model hours. For sim-
plicity, only the sender and the receiver country are shown here, however other fields may have also
affected the ranking.
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Sanity check — same hour First, we make sure that the transactions are not surprising when they
come from the model’s bucket (0.5 is the neutral rank):
03:00 on Monday
Most surprising
rank sender receiver ...
0.551 IT DE ...
0.550 DE DE ...
0.549 AT DE ...
0.548 DE DE ...
0.547 DE DE ...
Least surprising
rank sender receiver ...
0.416 DK US ...
0.414 US US ...
0.408 US US ...
0.406 US US ...
0.386 HK IE ...
The highest probability is≈ 0.55 and the lowest is≈ 0.39 which is a rather narrow range of surprise,
as expected.
Different hours within the same day Comparing different hours on the same day helps give
interpretation to different similarity regions (colored boxes) in Figure 4b.
12:00 vs. 3:00 on Wednesday
rank sender receiver ...
0.999 US US ...
0.930 US US ...
0.900 US US ...
0.886 US US ...
0.884 US US ...
3:00 vs. 12:00 on Wednesday
rank sender receiver ...
0.724 GB GB ...
0.718 IT IT ...
0.718 IT IT ...
0.717 GB GB ...
0.716 IT IT ...
The most surprising transactions at 12:00 on Wednesday compared to 3:00 are payments within
the US. When ranked in the opposite direction (ranking is not symmetric), the most surprising
transactions at 3:00 compared to 12:00 are payments within Europe. Let’s now check the evening
hours:
22:00 vs. 12:00 on Wednesday
rank sender receiver ...
0.706 HK TW ...
0.705 AU AU ...
0.703 AU AU ...
0.703 AU AU ...
0.702 HK HK ...
At 22:00 the most surprising transactions relative to 12:00 are those within the Far East.
Same hour, different days Same hours on different days are generally similar, but we saw that
weekends are different from weekdays. Let’s try to explain some of the differences:
2:00 on Sunday vs. on Monday
rank sender receiver ...
0.705 DE DE ...
0.704 DE DE ...
0.699 DE DE ...
0.699 DE DE ...
0.699 DE DE ...
At 2:00 on Sunday the most surprising transactions relative to Monday 2:00am are certain payments
within Germany (probably involving other attributes).
5.2 London Crime Data
The Kaggle data set of London Crime [1] contains ≈ 6.5 million of unique crime cases for years
2008–2016. Each crime case record contains the crime category, the borough were the crime hap-
pened, and the year and month of the event. We divided the data into 9 buckets, a bucket per year. In
the expanded form, each record is represented by a 78-dimensional vector. 8-dimensional internal
representation was used. All fields are categorical, hence binary cross-entropy loss was used as the
reconstruction loss of the autoencoder.
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Figure 5: Novelty in London crime data.
5.2.1 Detection
Figure 5 presents results of quantifying novelty between different years.
Figure 5a shows relative novelty for each pair of years. The lighter the square the more similar the
years are. Subsequent years are similar to each other, the further apart the years the greater is the
mutual novelty.
Figure 5b shows novelty (maximum KS statistic over the dimensions of the internal representation)
of each year relative to the model trained on data of all years. Years 2010-2011 appear to be the
closest to the overall distribution of crimes, with years at the beginning and the end of the year range
farther apart. Year 2016 is much further from the overall distribution than year 2008 though.
5.2.2 Ranking
To illustrate insights which can be obtained through ranking of anomalous records we compare the
first and the last year in the span to each other, as well as the overall distribution to the last year.
In year 2008 compared to 2016 the highest ranked records compared to year 2016 are theft from mo-
tor vehicle in several boroughs. This can be interpreted as that the frequency of this crime decreased
in London by 2016.
2008 vs. 2016
rank month category borough
0.807 10 Other Theft Westminster
0.743 2 Theft From Motor Vehicle Islington
0.721 2 Theft From Motor Vehicle Wandsworth
0.720 2 Other Theft Haringey
0.717 2 Theft From Motor Vehicle Hammersmith and Fulham
In 2016 compared to 2008 the highest ranked record is of harassment. Note that harassment is
not an outlier in 2008 — 5% of reported crimes are harassment, compared to 11% in 2016. Still,
harassment records appear to constitute the greatest novelty in 2016.
2016 vs. 2008
rank month category borough
0.732 7 Harassment Newham
0.725 1 Harassment Lambeth
0.722 2 Harassment Hillingdon
0.722 5 Harassment Hounslow
0.719 1 Harassment Harrow
Comparing all year’s data to the model of 2016 we find that the highest ranked records are of assault
with injury in central boroughs of London. That can be interpreted as that that particular crime was
frequent in central London, but the frequency decreased by 2016.
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Figure 6: ROC (a) and Precision-Recall (b) curves of DNS exfiltration detection.
all years vs. 2016
rank month category borough
0.800 10 Other Theft Westminster
0.744 7 Assault with Injury Westminster
0.720 7 Assault with Injury Kensington and Chelsea
0.716 7 Assault with Injury Lambeth
0.713 5 Personal Property Westminster
5.3 DNS-based data exfiltration
We applied the method to detection of DNS-based data exfiltration. The CAIDA UCSD DNS Names
Dataset [2] was used.
We emulate data exfiltration by replacing the last component of domain in a certain fraction of the
data set with a sequence of characters sampled from characters permitted in domain names (upper-
case and lowercase letters, as well as digits and the dash). For example, foobar.example.com
might be replaced with AsdR5t.example.com. This method approximates the distribution of
encoded data, while still keeping the distribution of domain lengths unaffected. 0.1%, 1%, and
10% of the entries in the evaluation data set are replaced with entries emulating data exfiltration.
Only domain names are considered for machine learning. The domain names were mapped to 64-
dimensional (by the number of allowed characters) vectors of character counts. 4-dimensional in-
ternal representation was used. Mean squared error loss was used as the reconstruction loss of the
autoencoder.
Figure 6 shows the ROC and precision-recall curves histograms of exfiltration detection.
Note that the classification accuracy (for the given amount of training budget) increases as the num-
ber of anomalous entries goes up, unlike in methods which rank every sample individually. This
self-boosting is a useful feature of the proposed method: the more severe the attack, the higher is
the ranking accuracy.
6 Discussion
We described a method for detecting and quantifying population anomalies in high-dimensional data
and evaluated the method on several application domains. An anomaly, or novelty, in the data is an
unusually high probability of occurrence of certain elements. Individual anomalies are commonly
detected based on low probability of the elements relative to the anticipated distribution, which is
sufficient but not necessary condition of anomality. Elements of population anomalies may still have
relatively high probability.
Population anomalies and methods of their detection have been subject of earlier research, however
the introduced method offers a black-box approach to population anomaly detection and is robust to
data set sizes and data types and distributions. One challenge for any population anomaly detection
method introduced so far which still needs to be addressed is explanation — summary characteriza-
tion of the anomaly instead of just presenting most anomalous samples. Our method may be a good
foundation for addressing this challenge, by allowing augmentation and reconstruction of anomalies
from the internal representation, a subject for future research.
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